Operational Reserves in Afcent: Another Look

Publisher Marketing: This study examines what the key issues are governing the creation and employment of operational reserves by AFCENT in its defense against a no or short notice Warsaw Pact attack. The theoretical notion of operational reserves as discussed by Clausewitz and the use of operational reserves as presented by FM 100-5 provide the background for an historical analysis of how operational reserves were used in three World War II defensive campaigns. From this historical analysis, implications for AFCENT are drawn. The primary conclusion of this study is that for AFCENT, the costs of creating a large operational reserve at the expense of its subordinate commands exceed the benefits. In fact, the concept of a reserve at the operational level appears to be fundamentally different than the concept of a reserve at the tactical level. A combination of several factors, some of the more critical of which are terrain, the political guideline of forward defense, and a defense organized around somewhat disparate national corps does not lend itself to the employment of large centrally controlled operational reserves. AFCENT should not attempt to maintain operational flexibility through the use of a large operational reserve. Rather, it should maintain its flexibility through the proper sequencing of engagements and battles, the acceptance of risk, and the allocation of critical resources such as air, logistics, and reinforcements.